When banks are hit by a severe liquidity shock, central banks have a key role as lenders of last resort. Despite the well-established importance of this mechanism, there is scarce empirical evidence that allows to explore this key role of central banks.
Introduction
One of the critical functions of central banks is to act as lenders of last resort. When liquidity suddenly dries up, the central bank should stand ready to supply liquidity to distressed banks, as long as their solvency is not in jeopardy (Repullo, 2005, and Vives, 2004) . Despite this critical role, there is scarce empirical evidence on this topic. In this paper, we explore a unique event of large scale that might be the perfect lab to assess the role of the lender of last resort in avoiding the collapse of a banking system.
We focus on a large unanticipated shock that hit the Portuguese banking system in the early days of the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area. Speci…cally, in May 2010, Portuguese banks suddenly lost access to international medium and long term wholesale debt markets, which represented an important source of their funding. This sudden stop scenario was mainly linked to investors'concerns on contagion from the sovereign crisis that was then emerging in Greece. In this context, Portuguese banks escalated their recourse to Eurosystem 1 monetary operations, which increased by around 20 p.p. of GDP in just a few months. Despite this large scale sudden stop, there were no apparent implications in terms of aggregate credit conditions. Against this background, we investigate the role of the Eurosystem in counterbalancing the adverse and unexpected liquidity shock that hit the Portuguese banking system and in preventing its transmission to the credit channel. Overall, we consider that given the signi…cant size of the ECB's interventions, it is important to assess their impact on the banking system and, ultimately, on the economy. The empirical analysis takes advantage of a unique combination of detailed and extensive datasets available for the Portuguese economy. The main dataset used is the Portuguese Central Credit Register (CRC), which has monthly data on virtually all bank loans granted by Portuguese …nancial institutions. We focus on loans to non-…nancial corporations, and merge this information with data on the balance sheet and income statements of the entire universe of …rms. Further, we collect monthly information on banks'liquidity, capital and balance sheet items, as well as on their holdings of Portuguese government bonds. Finally, we also gather bank-level data on the recourse to monetary policy operations and standing facilities, the collateral pool and reserve requirements compliance.
Ensuring a proper identi…cation of the role of the enhanced liquidity provision by the ECB raises signi…cant challenges. In this respect, several features of the data help in the identi…cation. First, the liquidity shock was arguably exogenous and unanticipated. Second, there was high heterogeneity in the individual banks' recourse to the Eurosystem, both before and after the liquidity shock. In this respect, exploring the heterogeneity at the micro level is helpful in the identi…cation of the main transmission channels. Third, the richness of the data allows a careful identi…cation of demand and supply in the loan market. In particular, we select only …rms that have a relationship with more than one bank and employ …rm …xed-e¤ects estimation in order to control for …rm-speci…c loan demand e¤ects (Khwaja and Mian, 2008) . Further, bank and …rm variables are included at their levels prior to the liquidity shock, in order to mitigate endogenous e¤ects. Finally, in order to address other sources of endogeneity concerns, namely regarding the recourse to Eurosystem operations, we also follow an instrumental variables approach. Several instruments are considered, including the amount of assets eligible to Eurosystem operations that are not allocated to the collateral pool, and the dependence of banks on international funding markets prior to the shock occurring. With these identi…cation strategies, we are able to assess the e¤ect of the expanded liquidity provision on banks'loan supply to non-…nancial corporations in a sudden stop scenario.
Our results show that access to ECB funding was essential in avoiding a collapse in Portuguese credit markets. Despite the sudden loss of access to wholesale markets, the virtually unlimited access to central bank funding helped banks to continue to provide funding to the real economy. We are not able to …nd any evidence of major disruptions in loans granted to …rms.
Taking a bird's eye view on the balance sheet of banks, we observe that there was not any sizeable changes in banks's loan book, capital or loan-to-deposit ratios. The basic intermediation role of banks was una¤ected, at least in the short run, by this shock of unprecedented magnitude.
Of course not all banks were a¤ected equally by this shock, as their starting points in terms of liquidity and capital played an important role. We …nd that banks with better liquidity positions were able to channel more ECB funding to the …nancing of non-…nancial …rms. In contrast, larger banks and the banks with higher capital ratios granted less credit than other banks which used similar amounts of central bank funding.
Though many things remained surprisingly unchanged after this unprecedented shock, banks'balance sheets were not unscratched. The increase in ECB funding during this period largely surpassed the liabilities that needed to be re…nanced. This lead to a (temporary) expansion of banks'balance sheets. We show that at least part of these excess liquidity was channeled to an increase in holdings of domestic sovereign bonds. This is consistent with the idea that there might have been some …nancial repression in this period, with sovereigns in distress encouraging banks to buy their debt (Becker and Ivashina, 2014) .
Finally, to clearly establish the role of the lender of last resort on banks balance sheet in this turbulent period, we design a simple counterfactual analysis. The main idea is to show what could have happened to banks' assets if there was not any alternative source of funding when access to wholesale markets disappeared in the spring of 2010. Given the strong dependence of the largest Portuguese banks on market funding, we show that a collapse in credit would be unavoidable without the support of a lender of last resort.
We hope to o¤er a valuable contribution to the literature, as the empirical evidence on the role of the lender of last resort is almost inexistent, with a notable exception being Drechsler et al. (2013) . These authors use bank-level data on ECB borrowing and …nd that euro area banks used this liquidity to engage in risk-shifting strategies, rather than to lend to the real economy. In contrast to the scarce empirical evidence, there is an extensive theoretical literature on the role of the lender of last resort, with an emphasis on potentially pervasive moral hazard problems that arise out of this insurance mechanism (Freixas et al, 2004 , Gorton and Huang, 2004 , Ratnovski, 2009 , Rochet and Tirole, 1996 , Rochet and Vives, 2004 , Wagner, 2007 . More generally, our study is also framed in the ‡ourishing recent line of research on the impact of unconventional measures, in particular using micro data (Andrade et al., 2014 , Acharya and Mora, 2014 , Chodorow-Reich, 2014 , Cantero-Saiz et al, 2014 , Garcia-Posada and Marchetti, 2015 . This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the role of a central bank as a lender of last resort, providing also a timeline of the main events in the period being analyzed. In Section 3 we describe the data used and in Section 4 we present an overview of what happened with banks during this unique period. In Section 5 we use loan level data to examine the role of access to central bank funding in corporate lending during this period of near-collapse of the …nancial system. In Section 6 we go beyond the e¤ects on credit, by looking at several dimensions of banks' balance sheets. This allows us to understand how this large and unexpected shock a¤ected the structure of banks'assets and liabilities. In Section 7 we take an additional step in establishing clearly the role of the lender of last resort in avoiding a collapse of the banking system, by attempting to design a counterfactual scenario. In Section 8 we summarize our main …ndings.
2 The role of a central bank under a sudden stop scenario Bagehot (1873) was amongst the …rst to acknowledge the role of the lender of last resort, arguing that "theory suggests, and experience proves, that in a panic the holders of the ultimate bank reserve (whether one bank or many) should lend to all that bring good securities quickly, freely, and readily. By that policy they allay a panic; by every other policy they intensify it." Since then, the consensus has been to lend freely, usually at penalty rates and against good collateral, to all solvent but illiquid banks.
However, the lender of last resort generates an intrinsic moral hazard problem, as discussed by Freixas et al, 2004 , Gorton and Huang, 2004 , Ratnovski, 2009 , Rochet and Tirole, 1996 , Rochet and Vives, 2004 , Wagner, 2007 . This mechanism has to be credible ex-ante to prevent crises. But if the mechanism is in fact credible, banks will know they will be helped out if they face severe di¢ culties, thus having perverse incentives to engage in excessive risk-taking behaviors. For instance, Gonzales-Eiras (2004) …nds that banks'holdings of liquid assets decrease when there is a lender of last resort, using a natural experiment in Argentina. This moral hazard problem is further aggravated by systemic behavior induced by collective risk taking strategies, in which banks believe that the likelihood of an intervention by the lender of last resort may become more likely (Fahri and Tirole, 2012) .
Despite the extensive theoretical underpinnings on the role of the lender of last resort, to the best of our knowledge, the only paper empirically looking at the role of central banks as lender of last resort during the global …nancial crisis is Drechsler et al. (2013) . Using weekly data on bank-level borrowing from the ECB, these authors …nd that euro area banks used central bank funding to invest in high-yield sovereign debt. This risk-shifting behavior was stronger for weakly-capitalized banks. These …ndings are inconsistent with the classical predictions of the lender of last resort theory, according to which banks borrow from the lender of last resort to avoid …re sales of their existing asset holdings. This should allow banks to continue lending to the economy, thereby preventing a credit crunch.
In this paper, we are able to perform a more targeted test of the role of the lender of last resort in a crisis setting. Since the early days of the global …nancial crisis, the ECB, together with central banks worldwide, actively intervened to restore the transmission of monetary policy and ful…l its mandate. This included not only a series of policy interest rate cuts, but also a large set of unconventional monetary policy measures. In the fall of 2008, the ECB adopted a …xed rate full allotment policy at its regular re…nancing operations, ensuring that all the liquidity needs of banks were met at a …xed interest rate, as long as banks had enough eligible collateral to pledge. Around the same time, the list of assets eligible as collateral was expanded, with several increments in the di¢ cult period that would follow. To some extent, we might argue that in this new setting, the ECB's role as a lender of last resort was signi…cantly expanded 2 . During this period, the ECB also implemented longer-term re…nancing operations (with maturities up to one year), foreign exchange operations and a covered bond purchase programme.
These measures implied a signi…cant expansion of the ECB balance sheet. However, Portuguese banks recorded only a mild increase in their access to ECB funding. Indeed, Portuguese banks were not hardly hit by the global …nancial crisis that followed the collapse of Lehman Brothers, as their exposure to subprime markets and, more generally, to US markets, was residual. Some constraints in access to interbank funding during this period were easily accommodated with occasional access to monetary policy operations and to the issuance of bonds with government guarantees. In turn, loan ‡ows were una¤ected during this period, with credit growth rates remaining signi…cantly above those of the euro area.
This relatively benign scenario while the global …nancial system was in distress su¤ered a blow in the Spring of 2010. Suddenly, Portuguese banks entirely lost access to funding in international wholesale debt markets 3 . This sudden stop scenario was not due to intrinsic fragilities in the Portuguese banking system. Instead, it re ‡ected the environment of heightened uncertainty in the beginning of the euro area crisis, when investors were wary of potential contagion from Greece. This sudden loss of access to markets was sizeable enough to compromise the survival of many Portuguese banks, which operated with relatively high loan-to-deposit ratios [around 190% at end-2009] . However, despite the high dependence on access to wholesale markets, when we look at credit growth during this period, it seems that nothing happened. The answer to this apparent puzzle lies in the lender of last resort support by the ECB. The unconventional measures adopted by the ECB early in the crisis allowed Portuguese banks to easily substitute market funding by ECB loans. At the same time, the ECB did not implement any new monetary policy measure and the Eurosystem excess liquidity remained broadly stable. In just a few months, the recourse of Portuguese banks to the Eurosystem increased by an impressive 20 p.p. of GDP. The evolution of this variable clearly illustrates the unanticipated nature of this shock ( Figure 1 ). If banks were gradually getting into distress, we would expect a gradual increase in this variable over a few months. However, access to Eurosystem funding clearly spiked in May 2010. Against this background, in this paper we explore this unique setting to empirically assess the role of the lender of last resort in a sudden stop scenario. Our …ndings will show that the lender of last resort played a key role in allowing banks to survive the perfect storm. which is a database managed by Banco de Portugal. The CRC covers virtually all bank loans granted in Portugal (all …nancial institutions granting credit in Portugal are required to, on a monthly basis, report to the CRC all loans above 50 euros). We consider only loans granted to non-…nancial corporations. All …nancial institutions are allowed to consult information on their current and prospective borrowers, with their previous consent, thus making the CRC a key information-sharing mechanism between banks. The CRC has information on the type of loan, the debtor and the amount, while also including information on loan defaults and renegotiations, as well as potential credit liabilities associated with irrevocable commitments.
The data on loans is merged with data on banks'characteristics coming from supervisory balance sheet data. There are 44 credit institutions in our database, of which 28 are banks, 9 are branches of credit institutions with head o¢ ce in the EU, 3 are factoring institutions, 2 are savings banks ("caixa económica") and 2 are mutual agricultural credit banks ("caixas de crédito agrícola mútuo"). We restrict the sample to the banks that were counterparties eligible to participate in Eurosystem operations, which leaves us with 29 banks. All institutions report monthly balance sheet data, with the exception of the branches of credit institutions with head o¢ ce in the EU, which report quarterly. For these, we consider data at end of quarter for the missing months. We also collect monthly data on banks'detailed liquidity reports. These reports include detailed information for banks'assets and liabilities in several maturity brackets, thereby allowing to compute liquidity gaps between assets and liabilities in di¤erent time horizons. The information included in these reports also allows to identify the value of eligible assets for Eurosystem operations in banks' balance sheets (including those that are not currently part of the collateral pool).
In order to control for …rms'characteristics, we also used data on …rms balance sheet and income statements reported under Informação Empresarial Simpli…cada (IES ). This data-base covers the entire universe of Portuguese non-…nancial corporations, given it mandatory nature. The frequency of the data is annual.
Given the nature of the unconventional monetary policy measures, it is essential to gather data on policy implementation. We collect data at the Eurosystem level, publicly available at the ECB website, on liquidity provided (or absorbed) in each type of operation, on reserve requirements and on current accounts and on the asset purchase programmes. More importantly, we also collect data at the bank-level on the recourse to Eurosystem liquidity by type of operation (both liquidity provision and absorption), on reserve requirements and current accounts, and on the pool of eligible assets to re…nancing operations.
Finally, we also collect data on banks'holdings of Portuguese government debt during this period, given its large increase and its relevance in the context of the sovereign debt crisis. Table 1 summarizes the variables used in the paper. The index i stands for bank and the index j stands for …rm. T is the moment in time to which the statistics refer. Variables description: Ln(assets) is the logarithm of the total assets of the bank. Liq ratio is the amount of liquid assets (cash, loans and advances to credit institutions and other loans and advances) over total assets. Solv ratio is the prudential total capital ratio. ECB fund is the total amount of liquidity provided net of liquidity deposited at the Eurosystem over total assets of the bank. LTD is the loan-to-deposit ratio of the bank. Liq gap is the di¤erence between liquid assets and liabilities with maturity between 1 and 3 months as a percentage of stable funding. Collateral is the amount of reported assets in the bank's balance sheet eligible for Eurosystem operations but not allocated to the collateral pool. Loans are the total amount of e¤ective loans granted by the bank to the borrower. Loans + lines are the loans including unused credit lines. PT bonds is the amount (book-value) of Portuguese government bonds held by the bank. The use of loan level data is a key source of identi…cation, as discussed above, as it allows us to perfectly control for changes in loan demand. Nevertheless, before we explore that information in detail, it may be interesting to have an overview of what happened during this period at the bank level. Figure 2 depicts the annual growth rate of loans to non-…nancial corporations in Portugal. Despite the huge shock on banks'funding, loan growth rates remained broadly unchanged during this period. Only more than one year later, after the request for …nancial assistance by the Portuguese government, loan growth rates started to get into negative territory.
Something worth noting is the substantial heterogeneity between banks. Figure 3 shows that even though the average loan-to-deposit ratio was relatively high, suggesting a strong reliance on access to wholesale debt markets, there is a lot of dispersion in this measure. This was possibly re ‡ected in the wide variation in access to ECB funding depicted in Figure  4 . However, despite the remarkable heterogeneity on the way the shock was felt and on the banks'reaction, loan growth rates were very concentrated around zero during this period ( Figure 5 ). Ensuring a proper identi…cation strategy is key in any empirical work hoping to establish a causality relationship between variables. This issue is even more challenging in a crisis environment, in which many things may be happening simultaneously. We try to explore the richness of the dataset available to maximize the potential provided by the quasi-natural experiment setting that we are examining.
Indeed, the nature of the shock itself helps to create the perfect lab to examine the role of the lender of last resort. The sudden loss of access to wholesale markets by Portuguese banks was largely unexpected, re ‡ecting a sudden rise in investors' risk aversion, amidst growing concerns on the spreading of the sovereign debt crisis hitting Greece to other vulnerable euro area countries. Given the fragilities on the …scal and economic situation of the Portuguese economy in that period, investors perceived Portugal to be the next "victim". These concerns actually materialized, with the government asking for international …nancial assistance one year later. Another important aspect to consider is that the ECB did not take any speci…c action as a reaction to these events. Portuguese banks were able to bene…t from a safety net that had been created throughout the previous years, including the …xed rate full allotment setting and the extended list of eligible collateral.
For identi…cation purposes, it is also worth noting the heterogeneity within Portuguese banks. Their situation diverged signi…cantly in terms of their recourse to the Eurosystem, both before and after the liquidity shock. Moreover, banks'dependence on wholesale markets was also heterogenous, meaning that banks were hit di¤erently by this shock. The same can be said for liquidity and capital bu¤ers. In this respect, exploring the heterogeneity at the micro level is helpful in the identi…cation of the main transmission channels.
Finally, the richness of the data allows for a careful identi…cation of demand and supply in the loan market. Though exploring this event using bank level data would allow to establish some relationships between access to ECB funding and credit dynamics, it is important to note that at this level it is not possible to control for changes in the demand for bank loans. However, given that we have loan level data, we are able to select only …rms that have a relationship with more than one bank. This selection, together with …rm …xed-e¤ects estimation, allows to control for …rm-speci…c loan demand e¤ects (Khwaja and Mian, 2008) .
Importantly, to further mitigate endogeneity concerns, all bank and …rm variables are included at their levels prior to the liquidity shock.
Our baseline speci…cation is:
where loan_growth ijt refers to the log change of loans between March 2010 and December 2010 granted by bank j to …rm i. This variable considers the total exposure of a bank to a …rm, i.e. it includes unused credit lines. ECB_f unding jt 4 is the change in ECB funding as a percentage of banks' assets between March 2010 and August 2010. Finally, X jt 9 are a set of bank controls measured at March 2010, to mitigate endogeneity concerns.
With this identi…cation strategy, we are able to assess the e¤ect of the expanded liquidity provision on banks'loan supply to non-…nancial corporations in a sudden stop scenario. Table 2 shows the results of the empirical strategy discussed above. We begin by running the regressions without controlling for bank characteristics. In the …rst column we show the results without …rm-…xed e¤ects, while in the second column these are included, thereby allowing to capture all dimensions related to …rm demand. In the third column we control for a number of bank characteristics, namely total assets, the liquidity ratio and the solvency ratio. In the fourth column we consider the same speci…cation, but using a slightly modi…ed version of the dependent variable, i.e., loan growth excluding unused credit lines.
Testing the perfect lab
The e¤ect of the increase of access to ECB funding on …rm loan growth is not statistically signi…cant in any of these speci…cations. This shows that despite the dramatic increase in this funding source (and of its heterogeneity between banks), loan ‡ows to …rms remained broadly unchanged. This result con…rms the idea that the access to the lender of last resort was essential to avoid a credit crunch.
Interestingly, we …nd that better capitalized banks were able to grant more loans than other banks. The same happened for banks with more comfortable liquidity positions, though this evidence is much weaker.
Even though we do not …nd any statistically signi…cant impact of access to ECB funding on loan growth across the board, it is possible that …rms were a¤ected in di¤erent ways. We explore this by running the regression presented in the third column of Table 2 for di¤erent …rm size cohorts, i.e., micro, small, medium and large …rms. The results are presented in Table 3 . The e¤ect of access to ECB funding is not signi…cant to any …rm size category, suggesting that there was not a credit crunch in any of these segments of corporate loans. In turn, the e¤ect of bank capital seems to be more relevant for the smaller …rms, while the liquidity ratio played an important role only for medium-sized …rms. Another possibility that could be considered was that banks engaged in risk-shifting strategies, by providing loans to riskier borrowers. In Table 4 we show the results of running the baseline regression separately for good and bad quality …rms, i.e., …rms without or with defaults in the last two consecutive months. Again, we cannot …nd any statistically signi…cant e¤ect of the role of the ECB. The only noteworthy di¤erence is that banks with more capital and liquidity seem to be more prone to risk-taking strategies in this period.
As shown above, there is substantial heterogeneity in the way banks were a¤ected by the sudden loss of access to wholesale debt markets. As such, it is quite likely that there are important di¤erences between banks. Our …rst approach is to search for di¤erences based on bank size. The Portuguese banking system is highly concentrated, with the …ve largest banks having a 70% market share of the corporate loan market. When we run the regressions separately for these banks, we …nd some interesting di¤erences (Table 5) . For the largest banks, we …nd a statistically signi…cant negative e¤ect of access to ECB on loan growth. This means that, within these largest banks, those that used more intensively ECB funds, as a percentage of their assets, actually granted less credit to …rms. One possibility, to be explored, is that these banks used this funding to increase other assets. The most plausible candidate should be government bonds, given the possible …nancial repression in a period in which loss of access to markets of banks was preceded by the loss of access of the sovereign (Becker and Ivashina, 2014) . In a way, access to central bank funding might have allowed some banks to smooth, to some extent, the e¤ect of this shock on the government sector.
Another potentially relevant source of heterogeneity is bank capital. So far, there seems to be consistent evidence that better capitalized banks granted more credit to …rms, during this period. To better explore the role of the lender of last resort for banks with di¤erent degrees of capitalization, we run additional sample splits based on this variable (Table 6) . First, we consider banks in the …rst and fourth quartile of the distribution of capital ratios. Access to ECB funding played a similar role for both sets of banks, not being statistically signi…cant. Second, we split the sample in a less extreme way, by considering banks below and above the median. In this case, we are able to …nd a statistically signi…cant e¤ect for the better capitalized banks, which, like the largest banks, granted less credit when they used more intensively the ECB's facilities.
Given these interesting di¤erences in terms of bank capital, it is also relevant to consider potential di¤erences in terms of liquidity. Indeed, the shock we are analyzing was primarily a liquidity shock, a¤ecting more substantially the banks that were more reliant on wholesale debt markets. To explore this, we run the regressions separately for banks with loan-todeposit ratios in the …rst and forth quartiles of the distribution (Table 7) . In this case, we are not able to …nd any statistical di¤erence for the role of the ECB. Interestingly, the capital ratio only a¤ects positively loan growth for the banks which depend less on access to markets, which were arguably less hit by the shock.
We perform a similar exercise for another measure of liquidity, the liquidity gap, which measures the mismatch between assets and liabilities in a horizon between 1 month and 3 months (Table 8) .Again, the role of the ECB was similar for both bank groups. Finally, we test whether collateral availability lead to any di¤erences (Table 9) . Banks with less collateral available for ECB operations might have been more constrained in using this funding. Once more, the e¤ect of ECB funding is not signi…cant.
As such, even though the shock that hit banks in the Spring of 2010 was primarily a funding shock, none of the liquidity dimensions analyzed seems to have played a signi…cant role.
Finally, to better explore the heterogeneity between banks and grasp potentially di¤erent e¤ects of the access to ECB funding, we consider another speci…cation such that:
ECB_f unding jt 4 + ECB_f unding jt 4 X jt 9 + X jt 9 + " ijt where captures di¤erential e¤ects of access to ECB funding depending on bank characteristics. The results for the interactions with the capital ratio, loan-to-deposit ratio, the liquidity gap and the eligible collateral are shown in Table 10 . The only statistically signi…cant result concerns the liquidity gap: banks with a larger liquidity bu¤er were able to grant more credit when they used ECB funding more intensively. Regressions include always …rm …xed e¤ects. All variables de…ned in Table 1 . Second line values are the robust standard errors clustered at bank level. * signi…cance at 10 per cent; ** signi…cance at 5 per cent; *** signi…cance at 1 per cent. clustered at bank level. * signi…cance at 10 per cent; ** signi…cance at 5 per cent; *** signi…cance at 1 per cent. 6 Where did the money go?
All the evidence presented so far clearly establishes that loan growth remained virtually una¤ected despite the sudden loss of access to markets and the massive increase in central bank funding that ensued. This shows that the ECB played a key supporting role in a scenario of near-collapse of the banking system. However, part of the story remains untold. The increase in ECB funding largely surpassed the amount of bank debt that needed to be re…nanced in 2010, thus leading to a (temporary) expansion of banks' balance sheets. A natural question is thus where did the money go.
In this section, we use bank level data to understand the main dynamics behind these large shocks. More speci…cally, we try to understand what (if anything) changed on the left-hand side of banks'balance sheets. In order to do so, we estimate a linear regression model such that:
where Y jt refers to the change of several balance sheet items between March 2010 and December 2010 in bank j. These include total assets, total loans to …rms (including unused lines of credit), the loan-to-deposit ratio, the capital ratio and holdings of domestic sovereign bonds as a percentage of total assets. ECB_f unding jt 4 is the change in ECB funding in percentage of total assets between March 2010 and August 2010. We consider a time lag between our dependent and independent variables to allow for some time to re ‡ect the changes in funding in the structure of the balance sheet. Table 11 shows the results of this estimation. We …nd that despite the large increase in funding through the Eurosystem, the impact on banks'total assets was not statistically signi…cant. The same can be told for loans and for the loan-to-deposit ratio. There is only a marginally positive e¤ect on banks'capital ratios. In sum, the structure of banks'balance sheets did not su¤er major changes despite the large and unexpected shock that hit the Portuguese banking system, thus showing that the Eurosystem liquidity provision through the …xed rate full allotment procedure ful…lled the role of lender of last resort and avoided a major collapse in the banking system. However, there is one balance sheet item where we can …nd a statistically signi…cant impact of the increase in access to ECB funding: banks that obtained more funds from the ECB increased more signi…cantly their holdings of domestic sovereign bonds. These results are consistent with those of Drechsler et al (2013) . Using weekly data on banklevel ECB borrowing, these authors …nd that euro area banks used central bank funding to invest in distressed sovereign debt instead of channeling funds to the real economy. This result con…rms the …nancial repression hypothesis presented by Becker and Ivashina (2014) , who argue that during this period sovereigns in distress encouraged banks to buy their debt. We should recall that the Portuguese government also lost access to markets in the spring of 2010. As such, our results suggest that the ECB played a dual role as lender of last resort during this period: on one hand it allowed banks to maintain loan ‡ows to the private sector, avoiding a collapse in credit markets, while on the other hand it allowed the distressed sovereign to re…nance some of its maturing debt. Without this support, the consequences for the …nancial system and for the economy as a whole could have been dramatic. 
where Y jt refers to total loans and total assets of bank j in period t. The coe¢ cient 1 represents the impact on these bank variables from funding via wholesale markets (securities refers to the amount outstanding of debt issued by banks in the previous quarter). X jt is a vector of bank characteristics (including liquidity and capital ratios). We include a time trend in these regressions, and con…rm that there is indeed a cointegration relationship between the variables. This trend can be related to common factors to Portuguese banks explaining their evolution prior to the crisis. In these regressions, we consider only the banks which issued securities at least once prior to 2010.
Tables 12 and 13 present our results, the …rst looking at the impact on loans to …rms (including credit lines) and the second looking at the impact on banks' total assets. In the …rst two columns of each table we show the results of these estimations using data until 2009. We see that before the shock there was a strongly positive relationship between market funding and banks'loans and assets. Portuguese banks strongly relied on access to international debt markets to …nance their activity. In column (2), we estimate the same regressions in the same period, but instead of considering the relationship between securities issued and banks'assets, we consider the sum of securities issues and ECB …nancing, which was very small at the time. Given this, the results are virtually unchanged.
In columns (3) and (4) we show the same regressions as in columns (1) and (2), but for the 2010-2011 period 4 . If our hypothesis is correct, we would expect the positive relationship between loans or assets and securities to break. However, this relationship should hold when we include ECB funding if this is a quasi-perfect substitute for the lost wholesale market funding. The results thus are strikingly di¤erent from those of the …rst period, con…rming our hypothesis: the positive correlation between debt issuance and banks' assets entirely disappears. The coe¢ cient is not statistically signi…cant for total assets and is actually negative for loans. The more market debt outstanding banks had, the lower their stock of loans to …rms during this period.
In the last column we consider the joint e¤ect of securities issued and access to ECB funding. For loans we still obtain a negative coe¢ cient. But when we look at the e¤ect on total assets, we …nd a positive coe¢ cient, showing that access to the lender of last resort was indeed critical to avoid a collapse in the banking system. This coe¢ cient is smaller than those of columns (1) and (2), suggesting that ECB funding did not perfectly substitute securities issuance. The results on loans and on total assets suggest that the replacement of securities funding by ECB funding was likely used for other purposes than expanding loans to …rms. However, it is important to note that in these regressions we are not controlling for demand e¤ects, unlike what we did when using loan level data. As such, it is quite possible that this result is a¤ected by a contraction of loan demand in a period of strong adjustment of expectations.
Another important hypothesis that should be tested is once again the existence of …nancial repression. In this way, we conduct a similar analysis on the holdings of Portuguese sovereign bonds by banks against banks'recourse to Eurosystem funding. The results are shown in Table 14 . The …rst column shows the results for the period 2005-2009 and no correlation is found between the two variables. However, for the period 2010-2011 we observe a positive correlation between ECB funding and holdings of sovereign debt, thus providing further support to the …nancial repression hypothesis. Note: All variables de…ned in Table 1 Note: All variables de…ned in Table 1 . The estimated model is equivalent to the one speci…ed in equation (1). The coe¢ cients on bank controls, the constant and the trend are omitted given the large values, as this is a regression on levels.
Only the coe¢ cients on the liquidity ratio and on the trend are statistically signi…cant for the …rst period. Nonetheless, the full results are available upon request. Second line values are the robust standard errors. * signi…cance at 10 per cent; ** signi…cance at 5 per cent; *** signi…cance at 1 per cent.
Concluding remarks
What happens when an entire banking system suddenly loses access to debt markets? At the very least, a credit crunch is likely to follow. More likely, the entire economy will be disrupted.
In the recent past, Portuguese banks went through an episode that could easily …t this description. In the early days of the euro sovereign debt crisis, when distress in Greece started to assume large-scale proportions, international investors suddenly became unwilling to provide funding to Portuguese banks, due to concerns about the sustainability of sovereign debt levels. Despite the magnitude of this shock, credit ‡ows during this period were virtually unchanged. This is even more surprising when we consider that Portuguese banks were highly dependent on this type of funding, as their loan to deposit ratios were close to 190%.
The answer to this puzzle has one very obvious solution: the ECB monetary policy framework allowed banks to obtain all the liquidity they needed almost immediately and without major implications on funding costs.
In this paper, we argue that this perfect storm scenario is also the perfect setting to study empirically something that has been absent from the literature: the role of the lender of last resort. By exploring very detailed bank data, we are able to document the critical role of the central bank in avoiding the collapse of the …nancial system and, consequently, of the economy. We show that even though funding with the central bank increased dramatically over the course of a few months, credit ‡ows to …rms remained broadly stable. At the same time, banks were able to play an important role in the …nancing of the sovereign, who also lost access to markets in this period. Without the supporting role of the lender of last resort, a collapse of the banking system would possibly have been unavoidable.
